Chapter 7 Social and Psychological Obstacles to Education and Citizen Action for Nuclear Disarmament
Chapter two described accounts of serious human and technical failures in U.S. and Russian nuclear warfare operations that could have resulted in catastrophic global events and consequences. Also, historically, media have under-covered these failures, while at the same time overwhelmingly sourcing “high officials,” the very perpetrators of nuclear weapons systems. Why isn't there a larger popular outcry about this overarching health and environmental problem threatening our very survival as a species?
Psychologists have identified numerous avoidance techniques that prevent individuals from addressing these issues. The three basic reasons offered by David Krieger's Nuclear Age Peace Foundation DVD, Nuclear Weapons and the Human Future: How You Can Help, are ignorance, denial and apathy. My own research strongly supports David's assumptions. During many discussions with people locally, nationally and internationally, I have found that most people believe that the threat of nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia has essentially gone away. There is considerable talk about the nuclear weapons programs of North Korea, India, Pakistan, and Iran, and increasingly people are concerned with the possibility of terrorist attacks with "suitcase" nuclear bombs, "dirty" bombs, as well as attacks with chemical and biological weapons. But, unfortunately, most people seem to have no conscious sense or concern regarding the Nuclear Sword of Damocles, of which John Kennedy spoke, which still hangs over our heads by a slender thread. This is due, in part, because some folks simply do not have appreciable knowledge of the situation. It is also true that most nuclear weapons are simply "out of sight and out of mind."
In this regard, psychiatrist, Jerome Frank has stated:
Nuclear weapons [in distant countries] poised to kill cannot be seen, heard, or smelled, and so we scarcely think of them. We have evolved no sense organs for detecting radioactivity, a very new hazard in the history of man, and so it is hard to maintain concern about fallout or even about growing deposits of radioactive strontium-90 nibbling at our bone morrow.
While it is true that many individuals simply deny that a threat exists, some individuals are fully aware of the situation, are not in a state of denial, but are totally apathetic because they believe nuclear holocaust is inevitable.
An understanding of these personal reactions, as well as several other common responses to the nuclear threat, is vitally important to those who intend to work with others for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. One does not have to be a clinical psychologist to grasp the importance of the various mental roadblocks hindering discussion of this issue. Therefore, a rudimentary understanding of these phenomena is very useful when talking with others about this perplexing problem.
"I Don't Know Enough About Nuclear Weapons"
Many citizens, including business people, academics and other professionals, hesitate to become informed about nuclear war issues because they see it as an "all or nothing" proposition. "Either I fully understand the weapons technology, its strategic uses, and its scientifically determined consequences, or I will not deal with the problem at all."
Most people do not like to appear dumb or uninformed; especially on issues which one takes a vigorous stand. Obviously, nuclear war is an arcane, highly complicated topic leaving plenty of room to display one's ignorance. And frankly, many in the "nuclear priesthood," those with interests in a perpetual nuclear threat system, have a stake in making ordinary citizens feel insecure and inadequate when addressing this issue. In fact, they really don't want their fellow citizens to confront the issue at all. So, they do their best to discredit average citizens who attempt to bring some sanity to the world.
Consequently, the first order of business of nuclear disarmament educators, activists and organizers, is to help others overcome any sense of insecurity they may feel when working on the problem. They may easily do so by going immediately to the bottom line and simply pointing out that nuclear weapons are immoral, illegal if used, and incredibly expensive. Furthermore, it can be pointed out that most of us don't understand the inner workings and hidden mechanism of our personal automobiles. Nevertheless, most people concern themselves with auto safety and accident prevention. The same reasoning may be applied to nuclear weapons. One does not need to fully understand nuclear physics or nuclear engineering to vigorously campaign against the very existence of nuclear weapons and the possibility that they may destroy our children's future.
It is also important to remember that many military officers, politicians (including most U.S. Presidents) and other civilian nuclear war strategists haven't the foggiest notion of how nuclear weapons really work, either. They just make decisions as to who will be killed with such technology.
When a potentially horrific problem such as annihilation by suicidal weapons of mass destruction threatens one's very existence and all one holds dear, one may simply "stick one's head in the sand." This mechanism allows frightened individuals to avoid facing up to the threat and horrors of nuclear war. It is often the case that such denial is bolstered by the thought that "there's absolutely nothing I can do about the possibility of nuclear war anyway, so what's the use in worrying about it." Individuals will often either completely ignore the problem, or distance oneself from it by assuming that political, military and scientific experts will handle the situation. My experience with individuals and groups in denial about the problem indicates the existence of what might be called the "glazed eye effect."
In my early activist days, I noticed that the very mention of nuclear war caused audiences to simply "check out," and act as if they were in a collective trance. Then, as I continued speaking on various related topics, they appeared to be passive and generally disengaged from my presentation. When the talk was completed, I usually received a normal amount of applause, but there were few follow-up questions or comments of any real significance. The person in charge of the meeting would then thank me profusely for taking the time to be with the group, and would give me a certificate of appreciation, followed by another round of applause. The group would then effectively disintegrate; at most, one or two individuals would come to the podium to wish me good luck in future work on my problem. Obviously, I was making no real headway in speaking to Rotary Clubs, Kiwanis Clubs, or other civic associations.
After experiencing this audience response on several occasions, I began to seriously read about and study the problem of psychological denial. Following such study, I decided to take another approach to the problem with a psychological technique known as "inoculation." This technique, in at least one form, is quite simple to implement. It involves an up-front description of how psychological denial actually works, and how it prevents individuals and groups from addressing issues that are frightening, or otherwise harmful to local citizens and their communities.
As I continued to meet and talk with civic organizations, I changed my presentation strategy. Instead of immediately launching into the facts and issues related to nuclear war prevention, I said something like the following:
Today, we will be discussing a topic that is unpleasant and frightening to most people. And, frankly, I would rather be here talking about music, sports, travel, or virtually any other subject. However, we must confront nuclear war because it is a distinct threat to our survival, and that of our children. Having said that, I need to emphasize that when some folks are asked to deal with it, they seem to just "check out," and simply refuse to address the issue or pay serious attention to any talk related to the problem. To some degree, this is an expected response. Anytime humans are faced with what appears to a totally overwhelming problem, with no ready solution in sight, it seems reasonable to just ignore that problem.
I'm here today to say that if we put our minds to it, there are things you and I can do to assist with a systematic effort to achieve mutual, verifiable arms reduction and abolition. It is my hope that you will do your best to stick with me, listen very carefully to the three major points that I will make in my talk, and then honestly and straightforwardly offer your ideas and questions during our 15 to 20-minute discussion period following the presentation. I also want to emphasize, that as far as I am concerned, there are no “dumb” or “insignificant” questions when we talk seriously about nuclear war. I will stick around for a while after the meeting to discuss any questions, criticisms, or disagreements that you may wish to address.
Once I began using this new approach, things started to radically change in terms of audience response to my message. Individuals seemed to be more alert, I received more questions and comments than before, and more people stayed with me after the meeting for more in-depth discussion. Thus, a simple explanation of psychological denial, as it relates to the discussion of nuclear war, has proven to increase the readiness, openness, and willingness of most people to carefully focus on the topic.
Insensitivity to the Remote
Another psychological block is the phenomenon known as "insensitivity to the remote." In discussing this problem, Jerome Frank said:
Human sense organs are magnificently equipped to detect tiny changes in the environment—a few parts of illumination gas in a million parts of air brings the housewife rushing into the kitchen; a match flaring a quarter of a mile away on a dark night instantly flags an onlooker's attention. Only the environmental events within the range of our sense organs matter, and like our ancestors, we have no biological need to detect and respond to stimuli that do not impinge on any sense organ. With distant events becoming increasingly vital to our safety, this deficiency—“insensitivity to the remote”—is a particularly important source of the general failure to respond with appropriate vigor to the dangers of nuclear weapons.
One way to deal with such insensitivity is to remind individuals and groups that decision making time to launch U.S. or Russian nuclear missiles is very short, and launch to landing times are 25 minutes or less. The “Timeline to Catastrophe” table in the appendix of this book contains such data. The table is useful in helping others to face what may seem to be a distant, abstract situation. In fact, I always carry a copy of the table with me for individual dialogues, and also use it as a handout for seminars and even larger audiences. There's something about having the "Timeline to Catastrophe" in hand that brings the threat of nuclear war out of the abstract into the concrete.
Jerome Frank also identified another psychological obstacle hindering meaningful discussion of problems associated with the threat of nuclear war:
Habituation, another property of our biological equipment, also impedes adequate appreciation of the nuclear danger. Survival in the wild requires the ability not only to detect tiny changes in the environment, but also to stop detecting them if nothing happens. If an animal kept on attending to every stimulus, his capacity to sense possible fresh dangers would be swamped. Therefore, continuing stimuli, except painful ones which represent a continuing danger, rapidly stop registering, thus freeing the sense organs to pick up new ones. The phenomenon is familiar to all of us—a person moving to a busy street soon sleeps through the traffic noise that at first kept him awake. As long as it is not overwhelmingly unpleasant or dangerous, any persistent environmental feature gradually comes to be taken for granted. One is reminded of Alexander Pope's comment on vice, “A monster of such evil mien/as to be hated needs but to be seen/but seen too oft, familiar with her face,/we first endure, then pity then embrace.”
As a new form of destructive power, the Hiroshima atom bomb, with an explosive equivalent two thousand tons of TNT, created considerable apprehension. Since then, the size of available nuclear weapons has about doubled annually, until today [In 1967] the world's stockpiles total at least 50 billion tons. We should be terrified, but because of habituation and insensitivity to the remote, we are not.
In talking about the nuclear threat, activists sometimes contribute to the habituation problem. On occasion, friends and relatives have said to me, "Bill, you have been talking and writing about nuclear destruction for over 40 years. Obviously, we have not had a nuclear war, and it seems that peace between us and the Russians has been fostered because both sides realize that nuclear war would be mass suicide. So, why do you continue to worry us with this problem?"
It would seem that nuclear disarmament advocates have sometimes been seen much like the little boy who cried wolf once too often. And of course, the problem with that story is that the wolf eventually did eat the sheep.
To counter the "cry wolf" situation it is essential to gently re-iterate the factual information related to historical nuclear weapons accidents, and to once again emphasize the folly of keeping U.S. and Russian nukes on hair-trigger alert. Even unconcerned and uninvolved individuals might be moved to support the de-alerting process, if they can be convinced that nuclear weapons are needlessly on hair-trigger status, and that "Murphy's Law" is a painful fact of life.
Often, when those concerned with nuclear disarmament encourage others to confront the threat, they find some individuals are almost totally occupied with the trials and tribulations of everyday life. After all, it is not a simple matter to put food on the table and to take care of the health, education, and other developmental needs of one's own family. When asked to discuss citizen responsibility for nuclear disarmament and human survival, it is not uncommon for parents to say, "I'm now overloaded as it is. If I am to take care of my family, I certainly cannot concern myself with a problem that I can't do anything about."
Such responses are very understandable. Many parents and families are definitely overloaded with the vicissitudes of daily life. Somehow, those who are totally occupied with personal survival have to be helped to understand that the threat of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert is also a very important aspect of their individual lives, and that of their children. It is also important to note that not all families are hard pressed to "make it through the day." There are many people who have considerable leisure, but who use it almost solely for consumer-oriented activities or passive TV watching, with very little concern for citizenship responsibilities. It is not the role of nuclear disarmament activists to criticize others for enjoying life. It is their job, however, to provide some mental stimulation for those who might consider helping the cause.
As previously mentioned, it is important to solicit the assistance of activists who are pursuing other socially responsible goals and objectives. If the dialogue for nuclear disarmament is successfully utilized, it is likely that many such persons will see the connection to their own efforts—in health, education, environment, and other areas of concern.
Feelings of Helplessness and Hopelessness When Dealing with “Large” Problems
Unquestionably, many individuals are fully aware of the nuclear weapons threat to human survival, but feel completely hopeless about the situation. They are convinced that they are helpless in terms of anything positive they can do to work on the problem. It is little wonder that some individuals have such feelings, which may be the result of a phenomenon known as "trained incapacity." The term represents a host of situations involving the breeding of narrow mindedness, tunnel vision and "hardening of the categories.” Burke defines it as “that state of affairs whereby one’s very abilities can function as blindnesses.” Also, feelings of helpless and hopelessness go beyond one's background, nurture and training, including such phenomena as current "stimulus overload," or authoritarian living and working conditions.
In a "pragmatically" oriented society like that of the U.S., students and citizens are taught to focus their attention on short-term, "practical" problems that "they can really get their teeth into" and wrap up in a relatively short period of time. In fact, they are subjected to civic and educational environments that discourage a large-scale global vision, one which shows the connection of their individual lives to that of the larger world. They are told to focus on problems in their immediate environment, and that leaders, experts, specialists and other powerful individuals will take care of big, distant problems like nuclear war. In short, many educational institutions, youth groups, churches, etc., train their clients to ignore problems "about which they can do nothing," and which require a substantial level of delayed gratification for their eventual solution. They are told to "live in the precious present." This type of living can be highly useful, but if done with exclusion of consideration to the past and future, it becomes an irresponsible way of life.
On several occasions, while conversing with adults, I have been told that I should narrow my own vision and do something practical on other local peace issues. The implication was that, some how, such activity will markedly contribute to the abolition of nuclear weapons. In other words, working on other problems of human conflict or inter-group relations will spin-out in a way that national leaders will be convinced to begin the disarmament process. One friend told me, "Bill, if you really want to do something for peace, you need to go back to conducting your seminars on interpersonal competence like you did in the 1960's. After all, how can we possibly solve problems like nuclear war, unless we seriously address the root causes of human conflict?"
Such thinking seriously undercuts any immediate attempt to get rid of nuclear weapons. My friend's reasoning assumes that nuclear weapons are only a symptom of a deeper issue—the inability of people to solve their conflict in a non-violent, harmonious manner. And, until we do get to that root cause, we can never hope to get rid of nuclear weapons. This argument overlooks many factors, including weapons profiteering, institutional empire building, basic technical barbarism, and others not intrinsically linked to basic human hatred and conflict. It also fails to take into account the fact that symptoms often kill the patient well before all root causes are even identified. Thus, waiting until we all learn to love each other will never achieve the abolition of nuclear weapons.
"Experts Know Best—Let Them Handle the Problem"
The topic of nuclear war can be daunting, challenging, and an arcane area of study if all its technical, strategic and organizational aspects are taken into account. Consequently, beginning students of the problem often experience feelings associated with stimulus overload. This can lead to feelings of ineptitude, causing them to give up their activities with the belief that politicians, scientific experts and military analysts/strategists are the only people suited to deal with the issue. Unfortunately, dependence on experts and political leaders has proven to be a seriously flawed approach.
As noted in Chapter I, politicians may obfuscate relevant facts, as in the case of President Clinton's rosy analysis of a supposed nuclear threat reduction, while at the same time his military planners were devising new and better strategies to frighten adversaries. Historically, highly lauded nuclear arms control measures have often been the disease for which they should be the cure. This has been particularly true when short-term arms control measures, such as the SORT Treaty, have been used to turn attention away from highly improved, innovative nuclear weapons developments.
It is also the case that highly trusted academicians and experts in international relations inadvertently, or sometimes purposely, provide information that is inaccurate. This causes people to either overlook, or to deny, the reality of the actual situation. For example, in 1972, I was invited to speak at a national conference in Washington, D.C. entitled "A Citizens Hearings on What is National Security." Another speaker on our panel was Hans Morgenthau, one of the world's most highly respected experts in the field of international relations. At one point in his speech, Professor Morgenthau stated that as bad as the Soviet/U.S. nuclear standoff was, the balance of terror had appeared to prevent war between the two superpowers. And while in no way was Morgenthau a "nuclear war hawk," he was of the opinion that the superpower’s nuclear threat systems were stable in terms of command and control.
Following Morgenthau's speech, I asked him if he was aware that four young U.S. Air Force missile officers in Missouri, and others at Air Force bases in various parts of the country, could launch their Minuteman missiles with no higher order from anyone. He replied, "You're telling me this, but where's your data?" I then quoted the following statement from my 1969 paper Rethinking the Unthinkable:
The fact is it is possible for four officers in a Minuteman Squadron to launch and start World War III without authorization from anyone. If four officers, in two capsules, decide to turn their keys and launch, then they can do so without orders from anyone. There is no absolute guarantee that orders have to be followed. Naturally this would be “illegal,” but who would be around to punish them?
Morgenthau asked where I got that information. I then explained that I had discussions with several launch officers stationed at Whiteman Air Force Base in Knob Knoster, Missouri, and that particular quote came from Air Force Captain Rick Beal. I also offered to provide him the names and phone numbers of five other officers who would confirm the four-man "illegal" launch scenario.
Upon hearing this, Morgenthau appeared to be somewhat disturbed. His concern stemmed from the fact that he knew the four-man launch possibility seriously undercut his brand of political realism, which saw mutual assured destruction (MAD) as a balance of power deterrent to World War III. Underlying the MAD philosophy was the notion that "If you do bad to me, I will do bad to you. Therefore, neither of us will do bad to each other because the result will be mutual suicide." However, a critical component in the MAD strategy was the requirement of leadership stability, both mental and technical. Neither the U.S. president nor his Soviet counterpart could be crazy, and above all, both leaders had to have COMPLETE and ultimate control of their missiles. Both criteria were absolutely necessary for the existence of a stable MAD threat system.
Thus, Morgenthau knew that if the unauthorized four-man launch scenario were possible, the stability of the whole MAD strategy was very fragile and grossly inadequate in terms of assured command and control of the weapons. Consequently, his concept of a bilateral balance of power, based on the system of mutual nuclear terror, was deeply flawed. Following the meeting, I met Morgenthau and gave him the promised list of U.S. launch officers. It is my understanding that in later presentations, he modified his reluctant enthusiasm for the MAD position, and even noted, "Four people could blow up the world."
This story points out that very well respected experts are often unaware of key information that runs contrary to their carefully formed opinions and cherished beliefs. One other point needs to be made regarding the episode with Morgenthau. Several of my colleagues were upset with my challenge of Morgenthau's view of the benefits of nuclear weapons. In fact, one of my friends said that I had essentially made a fool of myself in challenging a man of his stature. From my point of view, it was ethically and intellectually necessary to do so. I did not pose my questions in a hostile way, but I was straightforward and firm in my approach to the Professor. The fact that he was a popular, world-class scholar was not, to my mind, grounds for failing to stress a very important point, which in some ways undercut a substantial portion of one of his major political theories. If somehow I was foolish in my approach, at least I was a "fool for peace and nuclear disarmament."
It is important to note, that the Department of Defense under Robert McNamara installed "permissive action links" or PALS, on the Minuteman missiles, which were essentially locks with specific combinations for each missile. McNamara called the PALS essential to preventing unauthorized launches. According to Dr. Bruce Blair, what McNamara didn’t know was that the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in Omaha quietly decided to set the “locks” to all zeros in order to circumvent this safeguard. The locks that could have prohibited the possibility of the illegal four-man launch were not activated until 1977.
A primary obstacle to local campaigns on behalf of nuclear disarmament is "narrow localism." In most small towns, suburbs and cities, concerned citizens naturally spend the bulk of their energies on matters related to schools, economic development, roads, health, education, sanitation, zoning, parks and recreation, etc. These are the vital issues and concerns that determine the quality of life in our local communities.
However, there is one additional local issue that often fails to receive adequate attention—the possibility that one's own community might be totally devastated by nuclear bombs. When activists approach local leaders with a request to hold town meetings or sign official declarations on behalf of nuclear disarmament, they often fail to see such measures as matters of local concern. In fact, they frequently emphasize the idea that they deal only with local issues, and leave international concerns such as nuclear disarmament to their members of Congress. The fact that missiles deployed thousands of miles away can wipe out their city in less than 30 minutes is not often recognized, or dealt with as a local problem. It is this kind of narrow localism that greatly hinders the movement for the abolition of nuclear weapons.
Such localism is often related to other avoidance mechanisms such as denial and habituation, and frequently takes two forms, which can only be called "tunnel vision" and "hardening of the categories." In dealing with local officials and others, it is very important to help them understand the concrete threat to community life and development. They should be informed that many things can be done educationally and politically to alert fellow citizens to the problem, such as plugging into programs of well-known national and international non-governmental organizations already seeking solutions to the nuclear weapons danger. Signing on to a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Declaration, or a presidential appeal for nuclear sanity are two major steps in a more comprehensive effort to change citizen attitudes. National and international adoption and implementation of the Road Map to Nuclear Disarmament is simply not in the cards, unless a significant number of local citizens pressure their members of Congress to support its measures.
One of the most prominent programs engaging local citizens on behalf of nuclear disarmament is the "Mayors for Peace" project, originated by Takeshi Araki, former Mayor of Hiroshima. On June 24, 1982, at the Second U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, he outlined what he called the "Program to Promote the Solidarity of Cities Toward the Total Abolition of Nuclear Weapons." Mayor Araki's proposal demonstrated a strategy in which local cities worldwide could work jointly to promote education and political action for the elimination and abolition of nuclear weapons from our planet. Accordingly, the proposal encouraged mayors around the world to support the nuclear weapons abolition campaign.
Today, the Mayors for Peace project has a membership of over 3,000 cities, in 134 countries and regions throughout the world. The project is officially registered as a United Nations non-governmental organization in "Special Consultative Status" of the U.N. Economic and Social Council. It builds solidarity, and facilitates coordination among member cities through advocacy leadership by spreading its message to, and establishing solidarity with, all who are concerned with human survival.
Cities can join by sending a letter from the mayor or chair of the City Council to the program's secretariat stating that the city supports the effort and would like to join. Not only will membership promote advocacy and education for nuclear disarmament, the very act of seeking program endorsement by mayors and city council members will, itself, bring nuclear weapons abolition to public attention.
Unfortunately, dozens of other social and psychological issues hinder serious study and action for nuclear disarmament. With that in mind, not everyone succumbs to the same roadblock. Giving consideration to those obstacles is a way to help newly recruited activists avoid discouragement when they are confronted with unresponsive recruits.
Marc Pilisuk and Jamie Rowen have addressed many of those issues in their book, Using Psychology to Help Abolish Nuclear Weapons: A Handbook, published by Psychologists for Social Responsibility. This handbook provides an invaluable tool for those who seek to educate and lobby for nuclear disarmament. One section of that book is titled, "The Psychology of Specific Audiences and Constituencies," which offers information and psychological advice concerning the following, and more:
§ Political Leaders and Public Officials
§ Reaching the Media on Nuclear Weapons Issues
§ Reaching Those Only Active on Local Issues
§ Radical and Evangelical Right-Wing Groups
§ Nuclear Weapons Developers
David Barash and Judith Eve Lipton have also provided an analysis of psychological issues surrounding the search for nuclear disarmament. Their well written book, Stop Nuclear War: A Handbook, includes a chapter titled, "Psychology: Thinking and Not Thinking About the Unthinkable." Topics in that chapter include:
§ “The Neanderthal Mentality:” fighting pays; we win—you lose; either you're with us, or you're against us; it hasn't happened yet, so it won't happen
§ Cognitive Dissonance
§ "Nuclearism," or the" Strangelove Syndrome"
§ “Shall We Overcome?": Religion; Morality and Sanity; Beyond Psychic Numbing
In sum, there are many social and psychological obstacles hindering widespread educational and political support for the prevention of nuclear war. However, these obstacles are not insurmountable if nuclear disarmament educators have at least rudimentary knowledge of their characteristics and work with others to overcome them.
 Kennedy, J.F. (1961, September 25). Address before the General Assembly of the United Nations. Retrieved from: http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03UnitedNations09251961.htm
 Frank, J.D. (1967). Sanity and Survival in the Nuclear Age: Psychological Aspects of War and Peace. New York: Random House, p. 27.
 Frank, J.D. (1967). Sanity and Survival in the Nuclear Age: Psychological Aspects of War and Peace. New York: Random House, pp. 26-27.
 Frank, J.D. (1967). Sanity and Survival in the Nuclear Age: Psychological Aspects of War and Peace. New York: Random House, pp. 27-28.
 Burke, K. (1984). Permanence and Change. University of California Press.
 Blair, B.G, (2004, February 11). Keeping presidents in the nuclear dark (episode #1: The case of the missing “permissive action links”). Center for Defense Information. Retrieved from: http://www.cdi.org/blair/permissive-action-links.cfm
 Details of the Mayors for Peace project can be found at: http://www.mayorsforpeace.org/english/index.html
 A free online version of their handbook can be obtained at: http://www.psysr.org/about/pubs_resources/Using%20Psychology%20to%20Help%20Abolish%20Nuclear%20Weapons.pdf
 This book is highly recommended: Barash, D.P., & Lipton, J.E. (1982). Stop Nuclar War: A Handbook. New York: Grove Press. pp. 214-239.